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CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION
SYNDROME: CURING THE EFFECTS OF
A MISDIAGNOSIS IN THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has described the prevention of child abuse as a
"government objective of surpassing importance."1 The prevention of
child abuse is also an objective of surpassing complexity and one the legal
community has found perplexing. The sexual abuse of children has com-
pounded the problem because it is a multifaceted concept which authori-
ties define in many ways.2 Child sexual abuse has been defined as
"[c]ontacts or interactions between a child and an adult when the child is
being used for the sexual stimulation of that adult or another person." 3
Under this definition sexual abuse may include anything from rape to the
use of children in pornographic pictures. The complexity of this defini-
tion is indicative of the breadth of this problem, which the lay commu-
nity has only recently accepted.
Although the sexual abuse of children is not a modern phenome-
non, 4 society is currently emerging from a period in which the prevalence
1. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
2. One commentator has used the term to describe five separate offenses:
(1) forcible rape in which physical force, threats or drugs are used to achieve sexual inter-
course; (2) nonforcible rape, commonly called statutory rape, involving sexual intercourse
between a legal adult and a child who does not resist; (3) sodomy, referring to oral or anal
intercourse; (4) incest, involving sexual intercourse with someone of close kinship; and (5)
indecent liberties, including a wide variety of acts such as exhibition, rectal stimulation,
masturbation, physical advances, and the use of obscene language.
Sarafino, An Estimate of Nationwide Incidence of Sexual Offences Against Children, in CHILD WEL-
FARE 127, 128 (1979). See also Abright, Psychiatric Aspects of Sexual Abuse, 4 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 331, 332 (1986); McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complain-
ants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1986) (noting that behavioral scientists have had difficulty in devel-
oping a definition of child sexual abuse).
3. Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
34 UCLA L. REV. 175, 177 (1986) [hereinafter Intrafamily Abuse]; PROTECTION OF ABUSED VIC-
TIMS 6 (I. Sloan ed. 1983).
4. See Abright, supra note 2, at 332 (documentation of child sexual abuse began as early as the
15th century). In fifteenth century Venice, sex between adult men and young girls was common-
place. Brothels of young boys were once common in Greece and Rome. Even Louis XIII was
included in the sexual acts of his parents. J. CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED 35 (1988).
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of such abuse was denied.5 Recent concern over the issue has prompted
research in the area and the results from these studies vary.6 Recent
studies are not merely concerned with the prevalence of abuse. Re-
searchers have also attempted to delve into the heart of child abuse by
exposing everything from the motivation of perpetrators to the behavior
of the victim.7 However, cases are grossly underreported8 and, therefore,
many statistics are extremely conservative.
Sigmund Freud was reportedly the first to note that sexual exper-
iences between adults and children might result in long-term psychologi-
cal effects.' Freud, however, erroneously concluded that the abuse
reported by his female patients was mere fantasy and discounted the re-
ports as hysteria.' 0 More recent studies indicate that most children actu-
ally are psychologically harmed by sexual abuse and that this harm is
5. See e.g., Thoennes & Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations
Project, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 1 (B. Nicholson ed.
1988) (sexual abuse was not specifically recognized by statute to be a reportable offense until the late
1960's); Wells, Expert Testimony: To Admit or Not to Admit, FLA. B.J. 673 (1983) (many child abuse
cases are missed or discounted because society has refused to recognize the existence of intrafamily
child sexual abuse in the past); Abright, supra note 2, at 332 (over the last 10 to 15 years the public
has exhibited a high level of interest in sexual abuse); Berliner, Deciding Whether a Child Has Been
Sexually Abused, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 48 (B.
Nicholson ed. 1988).
6. Dr. Diana Russel reportedly began the first truly random sexual abuse survey in 1979 and
found that 30% of the women she questioned had been sexually abused before the age of 18 and that
28% of those who had been seriously abused had been abused before the age of 14. As experts
debated over the validity of these results, Bud Lewis conducted a random national survey in 1985
which included both genders. Lewis found that 27% of the women and 16% of the men questioned
had been sexually abused as children. One-third of the victims said that they never disclosed the
abuse to anyone and of those who exposed the truth, only 3% reported the abuse to the police. 1.
CREWDSON, supra note 4, at 25-29. In 1973, one commentator estimated that there were as many as
500,000 child sexual abuse cases per year whereas the Department of Health and Human Services
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect estimated the annual occurrence to be 100,000 in 1981.
Estimating the incidence of abuse is difficult because it can be determined by criminal statistics, child
abuse reports, and epidimological studies. Each method has inherent problems. Criminal statistics
are underestimated because few child sexual abuse cases end in conviction, and under-reporting
causes child abuse reports to be inaccurate and epidimological studies to be biased. Myers, The
Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children? 24 J. FAM. L. 149, 170 n.64 (1985-
86).
7. See e.g., Blumberg, Treatment of the Abused Child and the Child Abuser, 31 AM. PSYcHo-
THERAPY 204 (1976); Peters, Children Who Are Victims of Sexual Assault and the Psychology of
Offenders, 31 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 204 (1977).
8. Prettyman, What Happened When Jenny Cried, DEL. LAW., Winter 1986-87, at 20 (no one
knows how many children are actually suffering from unreported abuse). Although every state has
mandatory child abuse reporting laws, many cases go unreported because the subject is still consid-
ered to be taboo. Furthermore, many families are reluctant to inform the authorities when the
abuser is a close family member. Blumberg, Child Sexual Abuse, N.Y. ST. J. MED. 612 (1978).
9. Abright, supra note 2, at 332.
10. Abright, supra note 2, at 332. See also McCord, supra note 2, at 2.
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manifested in one way or another."'
Evidence of sexual abuse may manifest itself in many ways. It is
common for the child to exhibit sexual knowledge that is inappropriate
for the child's age and maturity level or to engage in inappropriate sexual
play and aggressive sexual behavior.12 Seductiveness, submissiveness,
unwarranted fears, self-destructiveness, sleep disturbance, regressive be-
havior, depression, rage, embarrassment, and other uncharacteristic be-
havior have also been attributed to sexual abuse. t3 Although the
presence or absence of such behavior is not conclusive evidence that a
child has been abused, authorities seem to recognize that it is at least
indicative of abuse. 14
Recent studies also expose aspects of child sexual abuse which con-
tradict beliefs commonly held by laymen. First, in the majority of cases,
the abuser is a person with authority whom the victim knows, such as a
relative or close family friend.' 5 Second, although the age of victims
ranges from infancy to adolescence,' 6 an alarming number of cases in-
volve very young children t' who are usually female."8 Furthermore, the
abuse is often repetitive' 9 and may continue for years before it is discov-
ered. Finally, studies reveal that the crime is not strictly a lower class
11. See e.g., Blumberg, supra note 8, at 612 (the consequences of child sexual abuse are more
often psychological than physical).
12. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROSE-
CUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, 1-5 to 1-8 (1987). See also Berlinger, supra note 5, at 55; Heger, Child
Sexual Abuse: The Medical Evaluation, in SEXUAL ALLEGATION IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION
CASES 106 (B. Nicholson ed. 1988); Sgroi, Porter & Blick, Validation of Child Sexual Abuse, in
SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 71 (B. Nicholson ed. 1988).
13. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROSE-
CUTION OF CHILD ABUSE at 1-5 to 1-8.
14. Heger, supra note 12, at 108; Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 12, at 72.
15. One study revealed that the number of abuse cases involving a person known to the child is
as high as 92%. Myers, supra note 6, at 171-72; see also Blumberg, supra note 8, at 612 (72% of
child sexual abuse cases involve a parent or parent surrogate); Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 179 (1983) (stating that the majority
of adults who molest children have a trusted or kinship relationship with that child); Wells, supra
note 5, at 673 ("The greatest number of child sexual abuse cases involve intrafamily perpetrators-
fathers, stepfathers, uncles, mothers boyfriends, and other formal or informal relatives-people who
have ready access to the child in his or her home.").
16. Myers, supra note 6, at 171 n.64.
17. Dr. Summit reports that the average age of the sexually abused child is decreasing. In 1979
the average age was nine and by 1981 it had decreased to seven. Summit, supra note 15, at 182.
18. See Abright, supra note 2, at 333 (citing that 80% of the cases reported involved a female
victim); Summit, supra note 15, at 180 (stating that -[i]n the current state of the art most of the
victims available for study are young females"). Although a majority of cases involve females, males
are also the subjects of abuse. See e.g., Freeman-Longo, Impact of Sexual Victimization on Males, 10
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 411 (1986).
19. See Summit, supra note 15, at 184 ("a compulsive, addictive pattern tends to develop which
1989]
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phenomenon.20 These studies contradict perceptions about child sexual
abuse that are harbored by many adults. Consequently, the legal system
must address possible jury misconceptions about child sexual abuse to
ensure the correctness of jury decisions.2
II. THE ELEMENTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION
SYNDROME
Dr. Roland C. Summit coined the phrase "Child Sexual Abuse Ac-
commodation Syndrome" (CSAAS) in a paper written to sensitize the
criminal system to the legitimate victim of child abuse.22 The syndrome
is separated into five categories23 that supposedly epitomize the behavior
of sexually abused children. Each element of the syndrome describes be-
havior which a child exhibits while adapting to an abusive situation.
The first element, secrecy, indicates that the child will keep the
abuse a secret and thereby allow it to continue. Since the average adult
expects the child to immediately relate the abuse, delayed allegations are
often discounted.24 In fact, upon the discovery of sexual abuse, most
parents demand an explanation as to why they were not informed ear-
lier .2  The child is rarely able to articulate a rational explanation to these
demands, which damages the credibility of the allegation. The adult may
feel that such secrecy is contrary to common sense and therefore dis-
count the allegation as a misunderstanding, fantasy, or lie.26 Further-
more, most children are emotionally dependent on the abuser, who is
continues either until the child reaches autonomy or until discovery and forcible prohibition over-
power the secret."); Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, in PAPERS
FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
[hereinafter PAPERS] 95 (1985) ("child victims are usually persuaded and tricked by known, often
trusted or depended-on adults into going along with repeated sexual acitivity over extended periods
of time.").
20. See J. CREWDSON, supra note 4, at 29; Abright, supra note 2, at 334 ("the profile of families
of sexual abuse victims is much ... like that of the average U.S. family."); Berliner, supra note 5, at
54 ("there is... no demographic profile of children who have been sexually assaulted"); Prettyman,
supra note 8, at 20 ("sexual abuse cases can be as varied as the men, women, and children who are
participants").
21. These studies indicate that both sexual abuse and children's reactions to such abuse are
beyond the experience of most jurors and therefore psychological testimony is, at the very least,
required to assist juries.
22. Summit, supra note 15, at 179-80.
23. The five categories are secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed dis-
closure, and retraction. Summit, supra note 15, at 181.
24. Summit, supra note 15, at 182. The cross-examiner often uses the child's secrecy to con-
vince the jury that the child would have said something sooner if the abuse had actually occurred. J.
MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE 146 (1987).
25. Summit, supra note 15, at 182.
26. Summit, supra note 15, at 182. It is common for defense attorneys to assert that the child is
[Vol. 25:143
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often a trusted authority figure27 who uses authority to distort the child's
perception of reality.28 The distortion takes the form of varying degrees
of intimidation that coerce the child into secrecy.2 9 Such intimidation is
possible because the perpetrator convinces the child that disclosure
would have negative, if not disastrous, effects.30 This distortion is then
collaborated by "an adult conspiracy of silence and disbelief" that often
accompanies any attempt to disclose the abuse.31
The authoritarian relationship between the abuser and the child also
results in helplessness, the second element of CSAAS, which is exhibited
by the child's continued tolerance of the abuse.32  Helpless consent is
misunderstood by adults who believe that a child's instinct of self-preser-
vation should compel the child to strike out or attempt to escape the
perpetrator.3 3 When presented with the fact that the child failed to react
in this way, an adult may feel that the event was the product of a child-
hood fantasy.
Dr. Summit rebuts these misguided assumptions by asserting that
the child's typical reaction is to "play possum" and cope silently with the
abuse.3 4 The child has no choice but to submit to the abuse.3 ' The sim-
ple fact that the child lacks the physical strength to resist, coupled with
fabricating the story. See e.g., State v. Catsam, 534 A.2d 184, 186 (Vt. 1987) (defense attorney re-
sponded to delayed disclosure by asserting that the child was fabricating the story). It is less com-
mon for defense attorneys to claim that the child is fantasizing the event. However, many adults feel
that children are unable to distinguish fact from fantasy. Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions
and Future Directions for Research and Legal Practice, in PAPERS, supra note 19, at 65 (1983). Most
children who are preoccupied with Oedipal fantasies are age three to six. An Oedipal fantasy con-
sists of the child's ideas of getting close to and being loved by one parent and excluding the other.
However, these fantasies usually do not consist of any explicit sexual material. Therefore, when the
child is able to provide explicit sexual details about an event, it is likely that the event is not a
fantasy. Faller, Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth 8 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
473, 476 (1984).
27. Summit, supra note 15, at 180.
28. Summit, supra note 15, at 181.
29. Dr. Summit lists a series of common lines used by the abuser to intimidate the victim which
include: "Don't tell your mother: (a) she will hate you, (b) she will hate me, (c) she will kill you, (d)
she will kill me, (e) it will kill her, (f) she will send you away, (g) she will send me away, or (h) it will
break up the family and you'll all end up in an orphanage," and "[i]f you tell anyone (a) I won't love
you anymore, (b) I'll spank you, (c) I'll kill your dog, or (d) I'll kill you." Summit, supra note 15, at
181.
30. Summit, supra note 15, at 181.
31. Summit, supra note 15, at 181. Dr. Summit states that the adult will commonly react
with disbelief and state something to the effect of "[w]hy did you wait until now if it really happened
so long ago?" Summit, supra note 15, at 182.
32. Summit, supra note 15, at 182.
33. Summit, supra note 15, at 182.
34. Summit, supra note 15, at 183. One writer quoted a victim as saying:
"I saw and heard him beat up my mother so many times that I was in constant fear that he
would kill her. I knew that I was no match for him, and I guess I believed that his sexual
5
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the perpetrator's psychological hold over the child, leaves the child no
alternative.
Sexual abuse is often a "compulsive, addictive pattern" which will
continue over a long period of time.36 As a result, the child must learn to
accept the situation and thus accommodate the abuse in order to sur-
vive.37 The accommodation fosters yet another distortion of reality in
which the child exhibits adaptive behavior in an attempt to control the
situation. 38 The child may channel the blame inward and readily accept
subsequent abuse in an attempt to receive some sort of award. 39 Accom-
modation may also be exhibited through substance abuse, domestic mar-
tyrdom, distortion of reality, hysteria, sociopathy, and uncontrolled
rage.40 These behaviors are often used by defense attorneys and other
adults to invalidate the child's allegations. Because many adults are sim-
ply not aware that these behaviors are indicative of the child's accommo-
dation of sexual abuse, they often misdiagnose the behavior.
In many sexual abuse cases involving children, disclosure is accom-
plished under suspicious circumstances. 4' For example, in some cases
disclosure may be exposed by family conflict. If a family conflict induces
disclosure, adults may discount the allegation as mere retaliation or re-
belliousness.42 An adult may not believe that the abuse occurred over a
period of many years.43 Furthermore, when the child's father is the
abuse was somehow better than the physical abuse my mother received. Total detachment
became my way of dealing with what went on at night. I would roll into the wall when he
came in, pretending to be asleep, trying to be a part of the wall."
J. FORTUNE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE UNMENTIONABLE SIN 163 (1983).
35. Summit, supra note 15, at 183.
36. Summit, supra note 15, at 184.
37. Summit, supra note 15, at 184.
38. Summit, supra note 15, at 184.
39. Summit, supra note 15, at 185. The reward can take the form of materialistic exploita-
tion or it can represent the more intangible goal of protecting siblings. Summit, supra note 15, at
185.
40. Summit, supra note 15, at 186.
41. Summit, supra note 15, at 186.
42. Summit, supra note 15, at 186. See also Prettyman, supra note 8, at 23 (defense attorney
asserted that the child was fabricating the story because she was mad that her father did not buy her
a pony for her birthday). Family discord is blamed for a majority of false accusations because the
child is either manipulated by the disgruntled parent or exhibits behavior in reaction to family stress
which is mistaken for sexual abuse. Sink, Studies of True and False Allegations: A Critical View, in
SEXUAL ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 37 (B. Nicholson ed. 1988); see also
Schuman, False Accusations of Physical and Sexual Abuse, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5
(1986).
43. Summit, supra note 15, at 186; see generally Myers, supra note 6, at 149.
[Vol. 25:143
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss1/5
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE EVIDENCE
abuser, the child's mother may disbelieve the allegation because she can-
not accept the fact that one of the parties involved has lied to her.'4
Therefore, the father may easily persuade the mother that the allegation
is groundless.
The golden rule in most child sexual abuse cases is that "[w]hatever
a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it."45 This reac-
tion is often a direct result of the pressure that the child must endure
upon disclosure. Disclosure forces the child to face both the disruption
of the family unit 6 and a legal system which often lacks sensitivity.47
The child may be blamed or placed into custody and is always interro-
gated and examined, both physically and mentally, by strangers. a8
Viewed in this light, the motivation behind a retraction49 is understanda-
ble. However, without explanatory guidance, jurors may place more
credibility in the retraction than in the initial allegation.
III. STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF CSAAS
Courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert
testimony and the decision normally will not be reversed absent an abuse
of discretion.50 The standard of admissibility is a process through which
the concerns of the legal system are applied to scientific knowledge.5
The standard therefore functions as an evidentiary valve which deter-
mines at which point scientific evidence may be used as legal evidence.
Psychological evidence, especially when addressed in the context of a
44. Summit, supra note 15, at 187. But see Blumberg, supra note 7, at 613 (in some cases the
mother may secretly approve of the abuse because it frees her from what she perceives to be a
burdensome sex role).
45. Summit, supra note 15, at 188.
46. Summit, supra note 15, at 188.
47. Many authorities agree that legal intervention may cause more harm than the abuse itself.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RESOURCE MATERIALS: A CURRICULUM ON
CHILD ABUSE 63 (1979).
48. When the legal process begins authorities ask the child to describe the abuse to countless
adults. If the victim is female, she must undergo her first gynecological exam, an experience which
many adult women dislike. Finally, the child faces trial, and of course, cross-examination. The
child is repeatedly traumatized and may eventually be placed in a foster home. Id. at 63-65.
49. One article gave four reasons for retractions: "1) pressure from the Mother because the
family has lost the Father's income after the disclosure; 2) fear of retaliation from the offender; 3)
conflicting feelings of love for the offender and hate for what he did; and 4) embarrassment concern-
ing the details and discussion of the sexual abuse." Prettyman, supra note 8, at 26 n.14.
50. G. WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.3, at 299 (1987). State v. DeJoinville, 145
Vt. 603, 496 A.2d 173 (1985) (upheld conviction based on expert testimony concerning the capability
of children to lie because the error did not strike at the heart of the defendant's Constitutional rights
and did not result in a miscarriage of justice).
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syndrome, may be considered "novel scientific evidence"52 and as such
courts have often required that this type of evidence pass a threshold test
for admissibility.13 Unfortunately, courts and commentators have not
decided what test is most appropriate for syndrome-type evidence. This
conflict has resulted in inconsistent decisions.
A. The Frye Standard
The controversy over the admissibility of scientific evidence began
with the use of a standard set forth in Frye v. United States. 4 The Frye
court held that admissibility of scientific evidence hinges on whether the
evidence has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs." 55 The Frye court made this standard a requirement to admissi-
bility because it decided that novel scientific methods are not trustworthy
until the method is accepted by other scientists in the field. 6 The Frye
standard is used to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evi-
dence via expert testimony. 57 As a result, general acceptance of the tech-
nique about which an expert is testifying becomes a prerequisite to
admissibility.
The most often cited criticisms of the Frye standard58 are that it is
too conservative, that it is vague and difficult to apply, and that courts
apply the standard selectively.59 The principle justification for the imple-
mentation of the Frye standard is that it excludes unreliable scientific
evidence from the courtroom.6 ° One court said the Frye standard forms
52. Novel scientific evidence refers to "evidence whose scientific fundaments are not suitable
candidates for judicial notice." United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d. Cir. 1985).
53. United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that a threshold test must
be satisfied when dealing with novel scientific evidence).
54. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
55. Id. at 1014. The passage most often quoted from Frye states:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
56. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
57. Id.
58. Frye has been heavily criticized. See e.g., Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75, 76 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (Mann, J., specially concurring), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970); Reed v.
State, 283 Md. 374, 400-09, 391 A.2d 364, 377-82 (1978) (Smith J., dissenting); People v. Williams, 6
N.Y.2d 18, 32, 159 N.E.2d 549, 557, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 761 (Desmond, J., dissenting), cert. denied.,
361 U.S. 920 (1959); McCormick, supra note 51, at 886-905.
59. Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 779-80 (1980).
60. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 191 (1983) [hereinafter
[Vol. 25:143
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss1/5
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE EVIDENCE
a "technical jury" of scientists who must determine the scientific status of
a technique before a lay jury may rely on the technique to resolve factual
issues.6 '
The criticism that the Frye standard is too conservative and thus
thwarts progress by excluding relevant evidence from the courtroom 6 is
persuasive, especially when applied to psychological evidence and
CSAAS. The Frye standard is simply too rigid for the psychological pro-
fession. If courts use this standard the divergence within the profession
itself63 will prevent any legal determination of a theory's scientific status.
The second criticism, the difficulty of applying the Frye standard, is
also magnified when Frye is applied to evidence within the field of psy-
chology. Frye requires the court to determine what evidence is subject to
the test. Scholars continue to debate whether psychological evidence de-
serves the status of scientific evidence.' Since psychology is a behavioral
science, psychological evidence cannot be quantifiably proven in the
same way as other scientific evidence.65 The distinction between psycho-
logical evidence and other scientific evidence has been referred to as the
difference between "hard" and "soft" scientific evidence.66
The application of Frye to CSAAS testimony is also difficult because
CSAAS may not fall within the bounds of a specific professional field.67
Although this complaint is not restricted to the field of psychology, it is
especially important in the CSAAS context because the behavioral sci-
ences are characterized by many different disciplines which often over-
lap.68 An understanding of CSAAS may arguably require a knowledge
Symposium] (background paper prepared for the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists by
P. Giannelli).
61. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977).
62. Symposium, supra note 60, at 192; Cf People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240,
1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) (the court stated that "[tihe primary advantage... of the Frye
test lies in its essentially conservative nature.").
63. See e.g., J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 123-27
(1970) (two psychologists working on the same study agree only 60% of the time); D. SHUMAN,
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 178 (1986) (the profession as a whole operates with-
out any general consensus among members of the profession).
64. See e.g., Borgida & Frazier, Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 984 (Sept. 1985); McCord, supra note 2, at 29-30; Melton, Developmental Psychology and the
Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. Fam. L. 445, 452 (1984) ("historical contributions of the behavioral
sciences to ... law have been clinical, not scientific in the strict sense.").
65. See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
66. McCord, supra note 2, at 27. ("Hard" evidence is the result of an objective analysis, while
"soft" evidence is the result of a subjective analysis.).
67. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
68. See e.g., B. HAMISON & M. ELFENBEIN, EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 15
1989]
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of child development and psychiatry.69 Since Frye requires a knowledge
of "the particular field"7 it will require that either one field be selected to
represent general acceptance or that general acceptance be obtained in all
the fields involved. Such a mandate is not only unrealistic, it is
impossible.
Finally, critics argue that courts have failed to apply the Frye stan-
dard consistently. Many courts have refused to apply the standard, 7'
others have adhered to it vehemently, 72 and some courts have used the
standard in conjunction with other criteria for admissibility.73 Courts
have also imposed the requirements of Frye to different aspects of novel
scientific evidence. The Frye standard has been applied to the technique
(1985) (the field of psychology has at least twelve different sub areas which it shares with the field of
psychiatry).
69. Courts have allowed psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and even policemen to
testify in child sexual abuse cases. See e.g., Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985)
(psychiatrist's testimony on CSAAS); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984) (clinical psy.
chologist's testimony on the sexual abuse of children).
70. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
71. Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1980) (master semen test), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 910 (1982); Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, -., 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982) (sodium amytol); State
v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 83-85 (Iowa 1980) (blood type characteristics), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981); Brown v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Ky. 1982) (GM antigen blood analysis),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983); State v. Cantanese, 368 So, 2d 975, 980-81 (La. 1979) (poly-
graph); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, -, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975) (polygraph); State v. Williams, 4
Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983) (voiceprints); State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 470-71, 623
P.2d 1095, 1101-02 (1981) (microscopic hair analysis); Phillips ex. rel. Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234-35 (Utah 1980) (HLA blood test); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458
(Wyo. 1977) (polygraph).
72. See e.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1981) (astronomical calcu-
lations); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-58 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microphobic analysis);
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (voiceprints), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,436, 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (neutron activation
analysis), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir.
1956) (sodium pentothal); Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir.) (spectroscopic
analysis), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873 (1946); United States v. Hearst, 412 F.Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (psycholinguistics); Rivers v. Black, 259 Ala. 528, 531, 68 So. 2d 2, 4 (1953) (drunkometer);
People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (1978) (scanning electron
microscopic analysis); People v. Sloan, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 623, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (1978)
(bitemark comparisons); Huntington v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 653, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 388, 390,
51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 260-262 (1966) (Kell-Cellano blood grouping test); State v. Washington, 229 Kan.
47, 54, 622 P.2d 986, 991 (1981) (multi-system enzyme blood testing), modified, 239 Kan. 443, 720
P.2d 1049 (1986); People v. Wesley, 103 Mich. App. 240, 245-47, 303 N.W.2d 194, 196 (1981)
(fingernail comparisons), aff'd 421 Mich. 375, 365 N.W.2d 692 (1984); People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d
706, 712, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (trace metal detection); State v. Smith, 50
Ohio App. 2d 183, 193, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (1976) (gunshot residue tests).
73. See e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973) (The court combined
the general acceptance test with three other requirements for admissibility. The court required that
there be a qualified expert, that the subject be proper for expert testimony, and that the testimony's
probative value outweigh its prejudicial impact.); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977).
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itself,74 the scientific premise which serves as the basis of the technique,75
and to the availability of experts to testify concerning the technique.76
Such an ad hoc application of the standard reflects the state of discontent
surrounding admissibility standards in this area and is indicative of the
need for specific guidelines.
B. The Relevance Analysis
The relevance analysis emerged as an alternative to the Frye stan-
dard as the deficiencies of that standard became apparent.77 The rele-
vance analysis is similar to that advocated by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.78
Essentially, the relevance analysis dictates that the probative value
of the testimony be weighed against the risk that the testimony could
cause unfair prejudice and confusion. One of the considerations of pro-
bative value is the reliability of the evidence. Commentators have pro-
posed many other factors also to be considered in determining the
probative value of a piece of evidence.79 These factors should adhere to
74. See e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 944
(1971); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979).
75. See e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975); Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978).
76. See e.g., United States v. Ridling, 350 F.Supp. 90, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1972); see generally Note,
Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 757, 765 (1979).
77. The traditional legal standard of relevancy has even been applied to polygraph evidence.
See United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976).
78. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states: "'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable than it would be without the evidence." Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." These are the standards which must
be weighed against each other under the Federal Rules. One commentator has even gone as far as to
advocate that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 be expanded to read:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or
otherwise. When the witness seeks to testify about a scientific principle or technique that
has not previously been accorded judicial recognition, the testimony shall be admitted if
the court determines that its probative value outweighs the dangers specified in rule 403.
Burger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1986). See gen-
erally McCord, supra note 2, at 27; see also Symposium, supra note 60, at 194.
79. Weinstein and Berger cite seven factors:
(1) the technique's general acceptance in the field, (2) the expert's qualifications and stat-
ure, (3) the use which has been made of the new technique, (4) the potential rate of error,
(5) the existence of specialized literature, (6) the novelty of the new invention, and (7) the
extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert.
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the Federal Rules requirement that to be relevant the evidence must have
a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."8 Therefore, under this approach, the court must
undergo a three-step analysis. The court must ascertain the probative
value of the evidence, identify the countervailing dangers, and finally,
balance the probative value against these countervailing dangers. 8'
The relevance analysis has not escaped criticism. One common crit-
icism is that the court must rely on the testimony of the expert to ascer-
tain the probative value of the evidence.82 This criticism has special
significance in the child abuse arena because it is felt that most experts in
child abuse cases are child advocates who are unable to be objective.8 3
Furthermore, reliance on the expert to supply the information essential
to this determination is naive because few experts will admit or even con-
sciously believe that the scientific theory or technique they advocate is
unreliable.
Another criticism of the relevancy approach is that it does not as-
sure the reliability of a technique prior to its admission.84 The relevancy
approach relies on the adversary process to expose deficiencies and there-
fore allows the jury to make the final determination of reliability. Courts
that apply the relevancy approach have expressed the belief that the risk
Symposium, supra note 60, at 194.
McCormick has advocated the use of eleven different factors:
(1) the potential rate of error in using the technique, (2) the existence and maintenance of
standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the tech-
nique, (4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible, (5) the extent
to which the technique has been accepted by scientists in the field involved, (6) the nature
and breadth of the inference adduced, (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the tech-
nique can be described and results obtained, (8) the extent to which the basic data are
verifiable by the court and the jury, (9) availability of other experts to test and evaluate the
technique, (10) the probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case,
and (11) the care with which the techniques are employed in the case.
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879,
911-12 (1982).
80. FED. R. EVID. 401.
81. Symposium, supra note 60, at 194.
82. Symposium, supra note 60, at 194-95 (quoting Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence, U. ILL. L. REV. 14 (1970)); See also Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1250
(1980).
83. See generally Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases In.
volving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1033 (1988).
84. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1239.
[Vol. 25:143
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss1/5
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE EVIDENCE
of confusion and jury misguidance is reduced by the opponent's opportu-
nity for cross-examination and rebuttal of the expert's evidence .8  How-
ever, it is suggested that the judge's determination is only concerned with
the admissibility of the evidence and that the weight assigned to the evi-
dence is a jury determination. 6
David McCord refined the relevancy test by proposing a four-factor
balancing test. 7 His framework for analyzing the admissibility of evi-
dence involves the balancing of four areas of judicial inquiry: necessity,
reliability, understandability, and importance.
The necessity element involves an inquiry into whether the testi-
mony involves a subject about which an expert can assist the ordinary
juror, and whether that testimony is necessary to counterbalance jury
prejudice caused by either the nature of the case or the nature of the
witness.88 CSAAS type testimony is necessary because the ordinary ju-
ror needs the testimony to prevent erroneous conclusions that the juror
may reach as a result of misconceptions concerning victim behavior.
CSAAS testimony will also counterbalance jury prejudice resulting from
misconceptions about child sexual abuse in general.8 9
Another "necessity" inquiry is whether the opponent's trial tactics
compel such testimony. 90 Since the majority of defenses in child sexual
abuse cases seek to discredit the child as a witness, the government defi-
nitely needs CSAAS testimony to explain the child's behavior.
The second element of judicial inquiry, reliability, involves an in-
quiry into the "general acceptance of the validity of the result by other
experts in the field" and an inquiry into the error rate of conclusions. 91
Although McCord asserts that false accusations are rare,92 he recognizes
that the testimony in this area is probably not demonstrably reliable. 93
The scientific community does not have the ability to definitively diag-
nose a sexually abused child, and therefore testimony offered to prove
that the abuse occurred or to vouch for the child's credibility should be
inadmissible.94
85. McCord, supra note 2, at 40.
86. McCord, supra note 2, at 40.
87. McCord, supra note 2, at 24-25.
88. McCord, supra note 2, at 34.
89. See McCord, supra note 2, at 34.
90. McCord, supra note 2, at 36-37.
91. McCord, supra note 2, at 38.
92. McCord, supra note 2, at 38. But see Sink supra note 42; contra Schuman supra note 42,
at 16-19.
93. McCord, supra note 2, at 39.
94. McCord, supra note 2, at 67.
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Understandability is the factor of judicial inquiry which focuses on
the jury. Since such testimony involves the behavioral sciences, it is eas-
ier to explain and is within the jury's grasp if it can be associated with
common experiences.95 This element also considers the availability of
other experts and specialized literature which an opponent may use.
Since experts are often social workers, few will testify for the defense. 96
Furthermore, such literature is obscure and hard for an attorney to find
without great expense. 97 As a result, testimony in this area is problem-
atic in this respect.
The final element to consider is "the importance of the issue on
which the expert testimony is being offered." 98 There is little merit to the
argument that expert testimony in this area is not important. Indeed, it
is the importance of CSAAS testimony that has made its admissibility
such an issue. The determination of this final step leads to the balancing
of all four factors to determine admissibility. McCord determined that
such testimony involves a high degree of importance and a low degree of
reliability. He therefore concluded that such testimony should be al-
lowed only to explain the child's unusual behavior, the child's capabili-
ties, and the capabilities of children in general. 99
C. Reliability Standard
Paul Giannelli expresses the opinion that the relevancy approach
does not adequately protect against potential misuse of unreliable novel
scientific evidence. He therefore attempts to strike middle ground by ad-
vocating the reliability standard." ° Giannelli notes that deficiencies in
the relevancy approach exist even when the procedural safeguards that
supposedly underlie the approach are in place. t0 ' His criticism centers
95. McCord, supra note 2, at 39.
96. McCord, supra note 2, at 39.
97. McCord, supra note 2, at 39.
98. McCord, supra note 2, at 40.
99. McCord, supra note 2, at 67.
100. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1245 (1980); see also State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980)
(admitting a technique which was not widely accepted and requiring that the reliability of the evi-
dence be established on an ad hoc basis), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); Lederer, Resolving the
Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 240 (1986). Lederer proposed that Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702 be modified to read:
If reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Id. at 241.
101. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1245. The relevancy approach assumes that unreliable evidence
[Vol. 25:143
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around United States v. Wright,'02 in which an appellate court upheld the
admissibility of voiceprint evidence after the developer of the test testified
that the method was valid. 103 Giannelli argues that even with the pres-
ence of procedural safeguards the technique was not properly validated
and was therefore admitted erroneously.1t 4
Giannelli argues that the burden of proof should be shifted onto the
prosecution to prove that the technique is reliable."0 5 Giannelli also as-
serts that novel scientific evidence requires a special burden of proof and
that therefore the standard of proof required to show validity in criminal
cases should be "beyond a reasonable doubt."0 6 Although he recognizes
that this is a heavy burden for the prosecution to bear, Giannelli states
that this burden should apply only to the validity of a technique in initial
cases. 107
IV. DEVELOPING THE STANDARD FOR CSAAS
A. CSAAS: A Misnomer
Much of the legal controversy about CSAAS is a product of legal
misuse and misunderstanding which is a direct result of the fact that
CSAAS is a misnomer. The term "syndrome" may refer to two different
things. In laymen's terms it is defined as either "a group of signs and
symptoms that occur together and characterize a particular abnormal-
ity" or "a set of concurrent things (as emotions or actions) that usu[ally]
form an identifiable pattern."'0 8 Medically, however, the term refers to
the aggregation of symptoms associated with a morbid process which
forms a disease. ' 09 CSAAS, as it is currently defined, is neither a disease
nor a pattern of abnormality. However, it has erroneously been used to
show that a victim suffers from a form of mental illness much like Post-
will be brought to light by the adversary process. The prosecutorial safeguards within the adversary
process are notice, discovery of test results, and availability of defense council. Giannelli, supra note
82, at 1239-45.
102. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1245 (citing 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967)).
103. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1245 (citing 17 C.M.A. 183, 193, 37 C.M.R. 447, 457 (1967)
(dissenting opinion)).
104. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1246.
105. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1246. Giannelli criticized the relevancy approach for placing
the burden of establishing unreliability of a novel scientific technique on the defendant. Giannelli,
supra note 84, at 1246.
106. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1248.
107. Giannelli, supra note 82, at 1248-49.
108. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1174 (1981).
109. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1382 (5th ed. 1982).
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Traumatic Stress Disorder, which describes the human reaction to sud-
den traumatic events.110
One example of the legal community's misuse of CSAAS is its at-
tempt to analyze admissibility of CSAAS through a comparison with
Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS).11a Although evidence of RTS has been
admitted, admissibility of CSAAS by analogy is inappropriate. RTS is a
descendant of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and deals with a sudden
traumatic event. The CSAAS elements, in contrast, are not always at-
tributable to a single traumatic event. The CSAAS elements describe an
accommodation process, used by the child's subconscious, to allow the
child to coexist with continual abuse.
Accommodation in this context refers to a psychological attempt to
control anxiety. However, the fact that a child has accommodated to
some sort of anxiety does not mean that the child was sexually abused,
because an accommodation process is not necessarily unique to sexual
abuse. For example, a battered child can arguably undergo the same
accommodation process and may be threatened or coerced into secrecy
by the battering parent in the same way that the sexually abused child is
coerced into secrecy. Psychologically, the abuse could affect the battered
child in the same way as it affects a sexually abused child.
One must carefully scrutinize the language found in Dr. Summit's
article to understand the distinction between CSAAS as it has been mis-
takenly defined by the legal profession and CSAAS as it is actually de-
fined. The paper begins by stating that "[t]he normal coping behavior of
the child contradicts the entrenched beliefs and expectations typically
110. A post-traumatic stress disorder is a form of neuropsychologic disorder which is character-
ized in adults by irritability, emotional liability, loss of initiative and sense of responsibility, and in
children by hyperkinesis, emotional liability, and disobedient, impulsive, egocentric behavior.
STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 415 (5th ed. 1982).
111. Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) has been accepted for the diagnosis of rape victims. Before
RTS may be diagnosed the following criteria, as set out by the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic-Statistical Manual (DSM-III), must be met: (1) there must be "an identifiable stimulus
outside the range of the normal experience that would cause severe stress"; (2) the victim must "re-
experience the event through thoughts, dreams or other disassociative behavior"; (3) the victim
must exhibit a "diminished interest in people or activities;" and (4) the victim must exhibit two or
more of a variety of symptoms such as "hyperalertness, sleep disturbance, abnormal startle response,
guilt, diminished concentration, or avoidance of activities remindful of the incident." Comment,
The Use of Rape Trauma Syndrome as Evidence in a Rape Trial: Valid or Invalid?, 21 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 93, 97 (1985); see e.g., Comment, The Admissibility of 'Child Sexual Abuse Accommoda-
tion Syndrome' in California Criminal Courts, 17 PAC. L.J. 1361, 1379-82 (1986). Some
commentators have also compared CSAAS to Battered Child Syndrome (BTS), but to do so is incor-
rect. BTS involves physical properties which can be more readily ascertained. See e.g., Note, The
Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO.
L.J. 429, 448 (1985) ("unlike sexual abuse syndrome, battered child syndrome encompasses a brief
set of narrow, specific, predominantly physical symptoms .... ).
(Vol. 25:143
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held by adults ... " ,,I12 This immediately signifies that the syndrome
seeks to define a coping process and not behavior that will identify the
existence of sexual abuse. Dr. Summit argued that the mental health
profession responded to misconceptions of child sexual abuse with an
explanation of victim survival behavior based on clinical behavioral stud-
ies of proven sexual abuse cases.' 13 The sole purpose of the syndrome
was to provide a "counterprejudicial explanation" for the otherwise sus-
picious behavior of the victim in hopes of sensitizing the system to the
plight of the victim.' 14
This "syndrome," as it relates to accommodation, is only a small
component of a syndrome which encompasses the entirety of sexual
abuse. Dr. Summit stated that "[a] syndrome should not be viewed as a
procrustean bed which defines and dictates a narrow perception of some-
thing as complex as child sexual abuse.""' ' After noting that many vari-
ables contribute to sexual abuse, Dr. Summit stated that the syndrome is
merely a "common denominator of the most frequently observed victim
behaviors."" 6 This explains why courts have trouble accepting CSAAS
as proof that abuse occurred. Since this "syndrome" is only a piece of
the child sexual abuse machinery, testimony concerning CSAAS may
only be offered for the purpose for which it was defined-to explain the
child's irrational behavior.
B. Unique Problems of Psychological Testimony
Two common criticisms of psychological testimony are that it is sci-
entifically invalid and diagnostically imprecise. 1 7 Although these criti-
cisms are a basis for the argument that greater restrictions must be
placed on testimony that has a psychological basis, they are also justifica-
tions for invalidating any admissibility standard that is not specifically
tailored to CSAAS-type evidence.
112. Summit, supra note 15, at 177.
113. Summit, supra note 15, at 178-79. Dr. Summit refers to the child as being "psychologically
orphaned and almost defenseless against multiple harmful consequences." Dr. Summit felt that this
type of situation compelled a response for the purpose of changing the system to meet the needs of a
child in an abusive situation. Summit. supra note 15, at 178-79.
114. Summit, supra note 15, at 179.
115. Summit, supra note 15, at 180.
116. Summit, supra note 15, at 180.
117. D. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 177 (1986).
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1. Scientific Invalidity of CSAAS
The scientific invalidity argument focuses on the fact that psychol-
ogy is a pseudo-science which does not involve the application of princi-
ples derived from scientific method.' 18 Some experts have asserted that
findings like CSAAS are merely theory' 19 and not scientific method.' 20
As a theory, CSAAS describes a general relationship involving sexual
abuse and behavior which some professionals believe to be meaningful in
the identification of sexual abuse. '2 ' The fact that a theory is meaningful,
however, does not lend support for its empirical validity or reliability.
The validity of a theory refers to whether it accurately predicts results,
whereas reliability refers to whether the results are consistent. 122
CSAAS can never be considered valid or reliable in a strict sense because
it is premised on behavior that is neither consistent nor accurate.
The causal connection between CSAAS elements and sexual abuse is
not verifiable because it is impossible to manipulate the variables in-
volved. Typical scientific experiments involve the manipulation of in-
dependent variables and control over other conditions which may
influence the dependent variable.' 23 Sexual abuse is not something that
scientists can re-create or control for scientific experiment. As a result, a
nonexperimental approach must be used to develop something like
CSAAS. With this approach, the scientist observes and measures vari-
ables as they occur naturally and is limited to the development of theo-
ries concerning the causal connection between various observations. 124
There is a problem with the validation of this type of study. Since the
118. Id. at 178.
119. A theory is a concept which attempts to organize observation and data into a category or
class. The theory is formulated to state the nature of the relationship between specific data and
classes as well as the interrelationship between the classes themselves. J. ZisKIN, supra note 63, at
40; see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1200 (1981) (defining a theory as "the
analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another").
120. A scientific method refers to relationships which have been adequately validated and can
therefore be asserted as established principles or facts. J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 39; see also
WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1026-27 (1981) (defining a scientific method as princi-
ples involving the recognition of a problem, "collection of data through observation and experiment,
and the formulation and testing of hypotheses").
121. J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 39.
122. IMWINKELRIED, GIANNELLI, GILLIGAN & LEDERER, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 84 n.6 (1979).
123. B. HAIMSON & M. ELFENBEIN, supra note 68, at 28.
124. B. HAIMSON & M. ELFENBEIN, supra note 68, at 184. CSAAS is an example of a retrospec-
tive research non-experimental technique. It can be compared to early studies concerning the link
between cigarette smoking and certain diseases such as lung cancer, which attempted to discover if
the disease was related to the amount ofsmoking. Studies like CSAAS must start with children who
have been abused and attempt to discover whether certain behavior is caused by abuse. CSAAS
indicates there is a strong correlation between the sexual situation and the tendency for children to
react in certain ways. However, it is not conclusive that these reactions were caused by the sexual
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scientist is unable to create the variables involved in sexual abuse, it is
possible that some unobserved or unnoticed variable that is related to the
elements of CSAAS is the actual causal agent.'25 For example, it is diffi-
cult to tell whether delayed disclosure is a direct result of the abusive
situation or whether it may be influenced by the child's age or natural
aggressiveness. Another possibility is that delayed disclosure is more
prevalent in a family in which physical abuse is also present or in families
where the child is given little emotional support. CSAAS does not pro-
vide an answer to these possibilities.1 26 However, CSAAS should not be
discounted for this reason because it is simply impossible to use any other
type of verification process to gain insight into the problem.
Part of the value of a nonexperimental method is that it may be used
to inspire experimental studies in the area.'27 If this were possible, it
might be a reason to reserve judicial use of CSAAS until experimental
verification could be developed. However, experimental verification will
never be obtained where sexual abuse is a variable because it cannot be
re-created or controlled in the experimental setting. As a result, the legal
community should recognize that this method of obtaining scientific
knowledge in the area, though problematic, is the best method for gain-
ing insight into the complexities of child sexual abuse. The legal commu-
nity must therefore adapt its standards for admissibility to reap the
benefits of this information while maintaining the appropriate safeguards
necessary in the search for the truth.
2. Diagnostic Imprecision of CSAAS
The use of CSAAS as a diagnostic tool to prove that the child has
accommodated to some sort of sexual abuse is potentially prejudicial be-
cause such a diagnosis is imprecise. Diagnostic imprecision refers to the
inability of the profession to agree on any single diagnosis of a person
allegedly suffering from a mental disability. 12' This criticism becomes
abuse. An unknown variable may be responsible for the abuse and for the child's reaction to that
abuse.
125. B. HAIMSON & M. ELFENBEIN, supra note 68, at 31-32.
126. CSAAS fails to consider many factors such as different age groups, different degrees and
variations of abuse, the quality of family life, the relation between the abuser and the abused, and the
child's maturity level. To be a truly comprehensive study about the effects of abuse on children,
these factors should be controlled by the observer and associated with the abuse that previously
occurred.
127. B. HAIMSON & M. ELFENBEIN, supra note 68, at 202.
128. D. SHUMAN, supra note 117, at 179-80 (a group of psychiatrists diagnosing the same person
disagree over the diagnosis 60-80% of the time); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging the "uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis").
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persuasive when a mental health expert testifies that a child is suffering
from CSAAS or has been sexually abused. 'Imprecision arises partly be-
cause the diagnosis of an individual involves a clinical examination1
2 9
which is often attacked for its subjective nature. Critics argue that an
individual's verbal or nonverbal responses to a subject are exposed to
external factors and that the examiner's reports and interpretation of the
data are subjective. 130 Because of the subjective nature of the examina-
tion, the diagnosis may vary from psychiatrist to psychiatrist.
When a psychologist or social worker clinically examines a child
victim for abuse, all of these defects emerge. For example, the investiga-
tive process may intimidate the child. By the time the child is inter-
viewed by a psychologist, he or she may have been poked and prodded
physically by a physician and questioned rigorously by parents and the
police. The ordeal has turned the world as the child once knew it upside
down, which may result in an array of behavior, including behavior
which experts have associated with sexual abuse.13 ' Since this testimony
is obviously wrought with problems, courts should not use it to indicate
that a child has definitely been abused.
When an expert testifies that a child has accommodated to some sort
of abuse, these criticisms of CSAAS become problematic in an additional
way. Although the behavior associated with CSAAS is not as subjective
as other behavior which experts have associated with sexual abuse, the
underlying motivation behind the behavior may be very subjective. For
example, a child may either delay disclosure of the abuse or immediately
reveal the secret. The same is true with inconsistent statements. The
child's story is either inconsistent with a previous story or it is not. How-
ever, the reasons for this behavior may be varied and extremely subjec-
tive. Since CSAAS does not account for all the possibilities for these
types of reactions, it is possible that the child has another reason for
129. J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 83.
130. J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 83-84. As a result, when a psychiatrist reports that a person is
hostile because that person has displayed a great deal of hostility in the clinical interview, one must
question whether that person is really hostile or whether the psychiatrist or environment of the
examiner elicited hostile behavior. J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 84.
131. Behavior which has been linked to sexual abuse includes: nightmares, sleep disturbance,
loss of appetite, regressive behavior, pseudo-mature behavior, withdrawal, acting out, difficulty recal-
ling details such as dates and times, fear of men and further abuse, depression, anxiety, embarrass-
ment, negative view of sex, poor relationship between mother and daughter, running away, and low
confidence in the nonabusing parent. It has also been suggested that serious psychiatric disorders
such as multiple personalities and schizophrenia may be associated with childhood sexual abuse.
However, there is no clear evidence to support the view that any one disorder is definitely linked to
sexual abuse. Abright, supra note 2, at 339.
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exhibiting an element of CSAAS. Furthermore, it is not clear whether
all elements of CSAAS must be present to compel a diagnosis or whether
a mere combination of the elements is sufficient.
Although these types of problems are present, they are not enough
to totally eliminate this type of psychological testimony from the court-
room.132 Substantive law currently applies psychology to legal concepts
such as "competency" and to factual issues such as the insanity de-
fense.' 33 As one author noted, the legal community continues to use a
model of behavior in which diagnostic labels are utilized in determining
whether relevant acts are a product of mental disease or defect.1 34 Con-
sequently, juries are required to reach diagnostic decisions and therefore
even flawed expert assistance is preferable to an unguided diagnosis.
The fact that psychology is not an exact science does not necessitate
the conclusion that courts cannot recognize it as an expertise.1 35 Courts
continue to make widespread use of such testimony1 36 and behavioral
science has become a valuable tool in the legal arena. Law, like psychol-
ogy, deals with the conduct of human individuals and their relationships
with others. The very nature of a legal dispute involves the behavior or
motivation of one person which is contrary to the expectations of an-
other. Therefore, courts should be cognizant that psychology underlies
many legal disputes.
The legal community will make a grave error if it attempts to condi-
tion admissibility of psychological testimony on the existence of impre-
cise, infallible, and noncontroversial theories. The exclusive use of such
theories will stifle potential positive uses of many types of evidence.
132. But see J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 81. Ziskin argues that psychiatry is at best a discipline
in its infancy and amounts to "no more than conglomerations of highly disputed speculations and
conjectures." J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 81. Ziskin also asserts that psychiatric and psychological
evidence should not be used in a court of law and if admitted, should not be afforded much weight.
J. ZISKIN, supra note 63, at 7. See also Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Exper-
tise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals,
and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978).
133. "Legal concepts such as 'amenability to treatment,' 'parenting capacity,' 'best interest of the
child,' 'competency,' . . . are framed in psychological terms." Abner & Reppucci, The Limits of
Mental Health Expertise in Juvenile and Family Law, 10 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 167, 169-70
(1987).
134. D. SHUMAN, supra note 117, at 180.
135. Works that advocate such a view include J. ZISKIN, supra note 63; T. SZAsz, LAW, LIB-
ERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); and B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972).
136. The more law has condemned and criticized psychiatry, the greater its demand for these
services has grown. A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY 106 (1984); see e.g., Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) (Justice Berger emphasized that the Supreme Court expressed no
disapproval of using psychiatric testimony).
1989]
21
Holmes: Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing the Effects of
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
C. Relevancy Analysis Tailored to CSAAS,
Since CSAAS testimony is not admissible to prove that abuse oc-
curred, courts should evaluate testimony offered to explain general char-
acteristics of abused children under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3
7
The imposition of a standard which is more restrictive than the Federal
Rules of Evidence is unrealistic and unnecessary. However, courts
should judge the probative value of CSAAS in the context of the case as
it is presented and in light of the psychological method used.
The course of the trial may influence the probative value of this type
of evidence. If the defense makes an issue of a particular characteristic in
an attempt to show that the child has acted inconsistently, 38 then the
prosecution should introduce CSAAS to counter the assertion. Since an
explanation of behavior often exhibited by abused children does not
prove that the abuse occurred or that the defendant was the abuser, the
introduction of CSAAS will not prejudice the defendant in any way.1 39
In a sense, the defense opens the door for admissibility of CSAAS testi-
mony by forcing the prosecution to rehabilitate the witness.
CSAAS evidence is also necessary if the child surprises the prosecu-
tor by recanting the story while on the stand. In such a situation, even if
the defense does not make an issue of the retraction, the court must af-
ford the prosecution the chance to rehabilitate the witness because the
retraction will not go unnoticed by the jury.
Courts should be sensitive to the fact that child sexual abuse cases
are frustrating for the government because they are so difficult to prose-
cute. However, when medical evidence of sexual abuse is coupled with a
competent and convincing child, the prosecution's case is easier and the
need for CSAAS testimony is minimized. Unfortunately, in most sexual
137. The Federal Rules of Evidence which apply to expert testimony in this area are Rules 401,
402, 403, 702, and 703. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible if it will
assist the jury in understanding "the evidence or in determining a fact in issue." The expert testi-
mony must also be relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. See supra note 78. Since CSAAS
testimony assists the jury in interpreting a sexually abused child's inconsistent behavior, and is also
relevant in interpreting the child's behavior, it meets the standard of admissibility set by Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 401.
138. The defense may raise the issues during cross-examination of the victim or other state wit-
nesses. These factors are most effective when the prosecutor is unable to rehabilitate the witness.
Gardner, Prosecutors Should Think Twice-Before Using Experts in Child Sex Abuse Cases, CRItl.
Jusr. 12, 15 (Fall 1988); see e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1984) (the defense made an issue of delayed reporting and the court held that testimony about the
general characteristics of abused children was admissible); People v. Benjamin R., 103 A.D.2d 663,
481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1984).
139. State v. Hudnall, 359 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (S.C. 1987) (evidence that is not admitted to prove
that the abuse occurred is not prejudicial).
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abuse cases there is little, if any, medical evidence. 40 When a case lacks
medical evidence and the child has exhibited elements of CSAAS, testi-
mony regarding CSAAS becomes an essential corroborative element of
the case. 141
Courts also must be sensitive to the effects of the recent United
States Supreme Court holding in Coy v. Iowa.142 In this case the Court
held that a screen placed in the courtroom to prevent the victims from
seeing the defendant violated the defendant's right to confrontation. "I If
the holding in Coy is interpreted to mean that all trial techniques that
prevent a child from viewing the accused are unconstitutional, then the
prosecution of sexual abuse cases will become even more difficult and the
140. Lack of medical evidence is not uncommon. Although semen or sperm may be found in or
near the child's vagina, rectum, or mouth, the finding is only conclusive of sexual abuse within
twelve hours. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, V-36 to V-37. This type of medical evidence is rarely found. Fur-
thermore, the presence or absence of sperm may have little evidentiary value because many sex
offenders are sexually disfunctional during the act and are unable to ejaculate. Another reason there
may be a lack of medical evidence is that the penis is withdrawn prior to ejaculation. B. Morosco,
The Prosection and the Defense of Sex Crimes § 9.09 at 9-46 [hereinafter Sex Crimes]; see also
Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34
UCLA L. REV. 175, 178-79 (1986). Acid phosphatase is other medical evidence which is difficult to
obtain. Acid phosphatase is an enzyme found in significantly high concentrations in seminal fluid.
Acid phosphatase will be present in semen even when the male has no sperm in the semen. It may be
preserved on bedding and clothing but the evidence is usually washed away before it can be ex-
amined. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROSECU-
TION OF CHILD ABUSE, 11-44, V-37.
Evidence of a torn hymen or a dilated gaping anal orifice can also be problematic. A gaping
anal orifice may be explained by the defense if the child has a history of constipation or neuromuscu-
lar disease. When evidence of a torn hymen is presented, the defense may counter with an expert
who will testify that some females are born without a hymen and that masturbation or other physical
activities may have caused the tear. Id. at V-38 to V-39. Although it is a popular belief that sexual
abuse has occurred when there is a torn hymen, this assumption is not always correct. Penetration
can occur without touching the hymen. If penetration is not violent, the elasticity of the hymen may
allow the hymen to adapt to the penetration without breaking. Finally, there is a problem when no
medical evidence exists and the child has testified that there was attempted, partial, or completed
penetration. In such a situation an expert may be needed to testify that placing a penis, finger, or
object between the labia could be interpreted by the child as being penetration. The use of lubricants
may reduce the chance of an injury that is conclusive of sexual abuse. Id. at 11-38.4. Without
medical evidence the child's testimony will become the "linchpin of the state's case." J. MYERS,
CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE 160 (1987). When this is the case, the trial becomes a contest
in which the child's word is pitted against that of an adult.
141. The most common forms of corroborative evidence in child sexual abuse cases are medical
testimony, the child's testimony, eyewitness testimony, and psychological testimony. If any of these
modes of evidence are weak, admissibility of psychological testimony will be more crucial.
142. - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988).
143. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the
right to unobstructed face-to-face confrontation of adverse witnesses. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. For
a more detailed examination of the issues and for a synopsis of courts' positions in confrontation
cases see Cukjati, Right of Confrontation: Screen Used at Trial that Prevents Testifying Child Sex
Abuse Victim from Viewing Accused Violates Accused's Sixth Amendment Right to Face-to-Face Con-
frontation, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 219 (1988).
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use of expert psychological testimony will become more important. The
Coy decision can affect the need for expert testimony in three ways. It
may make the child in any given case unavailable or incompetent. It
may increase the occurrence of contradictory testimony offered by the
child while on the stand. Finally, it may result in an increase in retrac-
tions on the stand.
A child may be unavailable to testify against the defendant for a
variety of reasons. The child may refuse, or be unable, to testify.", The
parents may refuse to allow the child to testify.' 45 The court may find
that the child will suffer severe mental harm if required to testify.' 46 A
judicial determination of unavailability or incompetency may result if the
trauma of the courtroom so affects the child as to render the child unable
to testify. 47 If the child is unable to testify, some courts may allow the
defense to offer the child's hearsay statements as evidence.1 48  If these
statements are inconsistent or amount to retractions, the prosecution will
have no choice but to offer expert testimony concerning CSAAS because
the child will be unable to explain the statements on the stand.
The courtroom experience is traumatic to a child. Without protec-
tive trial devices such as the one used in Coy, many children may react
unfavorably to the government's case while on the stand. 149 The child
144. One commentator noted that a child may shut down all communication on the subject and
refuse to answer questions because the child is frustrated and angry with the legal system. MacFar-
lane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Uses of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in PAPERS,
supra note 19, at 122; see also Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1983) (a four year-old child
was found to be incompetent because she was unable to respond to questions due to shyness and
awe), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984); Comment, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse
Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 819 (1985) (If "the child proves
too frightened or inarticulate to allow any meaningful examination [while on the stand], then a
finding of unavailability would be justified."). For a review of cases in which courts have found
children to be incapable to testify see McComb, Unavailability and Admissibility: Are a Child's Out-
of-Court Statements About Sexual Abuse Admissible if the Child Does Not Testify at Trial?, 76 KY.
L.J. 531, 532 n.3 (1987-88).
145. If the investigation or preliminary matters begin to traumatize the child, the parents may
elect to discontinue the investigation.
146. See e.g., Perez v. State, 500 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). One commentator
who reviewed the subject stressed the fact that potential abuses warrant the court's strict adherence
to a finding that the child will suffer severe psychological injury before the child can be deemed
unavailable. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985).
147. See generally J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE 53 (1987).
148. See generally Graham, supra note 146; Whitcomb, Assisting Child Victims in the Courts:
The Practical Side of Legislative Reform, in PAPERS, supra note 19, at 17. See also Yun, A Compre.
hensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745 (1983).
149. Boerma, How to Overcome Barriers and to Develop Creative and Innovative Approaches In
the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in PAPERS, supra note 19, at 37 (stating that "[a]ll
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may find face-to-face confrontation intimidating and may recant in an
attempt to escape the situation. Cross-examination in an adversarial en-
vironment may confuse the child and therefore result in conflicting or
vague versions of the abuse. Without expert testimony, the jury may see
these reactions as indicative that the abuse did not occur.
Courts should not disregard CSAAS merely because it cannot be
supported by experimental methods. If courts are reluctant to use
CSAAS, they could consider other studies in the field that take into ac-
count, and explain, elements of CSAAS. These other studies help to vali-
date CSAAS. Since the nonexperimental method used in these studies is
the only method which the prosecution can use to obtain this type of
information, courts should respect its credibility.
The major flaw of CSAAS testimony when it is used to explain the
reactions of abused children is that the study lacks depth. Dr. Summit
fails to focus on specific variables to discover whether elements of
CSAAS are associated solely with sexual abuse or whether the elements
operate in conjunction with the characteristics of the child, the family,
or the abuser. For example, it is difficult to determine whether elements
of CSAAS are present in abused children of all ages or whether there is
an age at which a child may exhibit none or only a combination of the
elements. The same is true for many other variables such as the fre-
quency and intensity of the abuse, the family environment, the maturity
level of the child, and the relationship of the child to the abuser. With-
out a more definitive causal connection CSAAS cannot be used to prove
that the alleged sexual abuse actually occurred.
D. Limited Admissibility Tailored to CSAAS
Courts should limit testimony regarding CSAAS to the purpose for
which it was developed: to explain behavioral inconsistencies of child
sexual abuse victims. In addition, the court should give a limiting in-
struction to ensure that the use of the testimony will not confuse the legal
community and juries. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 states that: "When
evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly." 5 ' Without a limiting instruction, juries
may be tempted to view CSAAS testimony as "scientific" support for the
conclusion that the abuse occurred or that the child is telling the truth.
150. FED. R. EVID. 105.
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An example of the application of this idea was set forth by the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals in People v. Bowker. 5' The Bowker court con-
sidered the general question of admissibility of CSAAS testimony within
the limitations of the Rape Trauma Syndrome decision in People v. Bled-
soe.152 The Bowker court explained that the Bledsoe decision and the
Frye test precluded the admission of such evidence to prove that an at-
tacker had abused the alleged victim. The court reasoned that Rape
Trauma Syndrome was developed to assist in the understanding and
treatment of victims and therefore assumes as its premise that an attacker
has raped the individual in question. 153 In reaching its decision, the
court noted that the line separating testimony concerning the general
characteristics of molested children and testimony concluding that where
certain behavioral criteria are met, abuse has occurred, is strictly
guarded. 154 The court stated that testimony concluding that abuse has
occurred, and testimony about general characteristics of molested chil-
dren which will allow the jury to conclude that a child is a victim of
abuse, is inadmissible.' 55 Furthermore, the court warned that testimony
on general characteristics of molested children may be more dangerous
because it allows jurors to draw predictive conclusions. 156
To reduce the danger of the jury's predicting a conclusion, the
Bowker court developed a two-pronged test for admissibility. 157 First,
the testimony must be narrowly tailored for the purpose for which it is
admissible.' 58 Testimony which is narrowly tailored is, at a minimum,
"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evi-
dence" and limited to exposing this misconception by explaining why the
child's behavior is consistent with abuse. 159 Secondly, the court must
admonish the jury that the expert's testimony is not intended to deter-
mine whether the victim's molestation claims are true and that it should
therefore not use the testimony for that purpose. 160
151. 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988).
152. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1987).
153. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 389.
154. Id. at 391. The court also noted that testimony describing the syndrome itself is not neces-
sary and that testimony on general characteristics is sufficient, Id. at 392 n.8.
155. Id. at 393.
156. Id.
157. See e.g., People v. Bothuel, 205 Cal. App. 3d 581, 252 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1988); People v. Jeff,
204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1988).
158. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 393.
159. Id. at 393-94.
160. Id. at 394.
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V. CONCLUSION
Because the need for this type of testimony is compelling, courts
should follow the solution posed by the Bowker court in all cases in
which an offering of CSAAS is made. Courts should exclude the testi-
mony if offered to prove that abuse occurred, because this type of offering
is inconsistent with the definition of CSAAS. If CSAAS is offered to
explain a child's inconsistent behavior, then courts should allow it. The
confusion in the legal community as to the proper use of CSAAS testi-
mony suggests that a jury may use the testimony improperly. Therefore,
courts must place explicit limitations on CSAAS testimony in order to
ensure that jury verdicts are untainted.
The legal community should not ignore the positive use of informa-
tion derived from CSAAS testimony. The methods underlying CSAAS
are imperfect, but are the only workable means of gaining insight into the
child sexual abuse problem. The legal community must, therefore, ac-
commodate its standards to the information, and its imperfections, in the
best way possible. Because the jury is charged with the responsibility of
determining whether the alleged abuse occurred, it must diagnose the
child. Testimony concerning CSAAS may aid the jury in its diagnosis,
and, therefore, further the discovery of the truth. Courts can accomplish





Holmes: Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing the Effects of
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss1/5
